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Abstract
This work studies the interactions between income distribution and monetary and fiscal
policies in terms of ensuing dynamics of macro variables (GDP growth, unemployment,
etc.) on the grounds of an agent-based Keynesian model. The direct ancestor of this work
is the “Keynes meeting Schumpeter” formalism presented in Dosi et al. (2010). To that
model, we add a banking sector and a monetary authority setting interest rates and credit
lending conditions. The model combines Keynesian mechanisms of demand generation, a
“Schumpeterian” innovation-fueled process of growth and Minskian credit dynamics. The
robustness of the model is checked against its capability to jointly account for a large set
of empirical regularities both at the micro level and at the macro one. The model is able
to catch salient features underlying the current as well as previous recessions, the impact of
financial factors and the role in them of income distribution. We find that different income
distribution regimes heavily affect macroeconomic performance: more unequal economies are
exposed to more severe business cycles fluctuations, higher unemployment rates, and higher
probability of crises. On the policy side, fiscal policies do not only dampen business cycles,
reduce unemployment and the likelihood of experiencing a huge crisis. In some circumstances
they also affect positively long-term growth. Further, the more income distribution is skewed
toward profits, the greater the effects of fiscal policies. About monetary policy, we find
a strong non-linearity in the way interest rates affect macroeconomic dynamics: in one
“regime” with low rates, changes in interest rates are ineffective up to a threshold beyond
which increasing the interest rate implies smaller output growth rates and larger output
volatility, unemployment and likelihood of crises.
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1 Introduction
This work studies the interactions between income distribution and monetary and fiscal policies
in terms of ensuing dynamics of macro variables (GDP growth, unemployment, etc.) on the
grounds of an agent-based Keynesian model.
The empirical counterpart of this work is quite straightforward. Major recessions charac-
terized by negative growth and prolonged periods of high unemployment rates are recurrent
phenomena in the history of capitalist economies, and so are persistent fluctuations in output
and employment. In all that, financial factors often appear to play an important role, at least as
triggering factors of the outburst of recessionary dynamics: it was so in the Great Depression of
1929, and similarly is with the subprime mortgage crisis in the current Great Recession. And,
on the real side, income distribution is a serious candidate in the determination of degrees of
(negative or positive) amplification of demand impulses. Interestingly, contemporary industrial-
ized economies have never been so unequal since the Great Depression. So, for example, in the
U.S. the ratio between the top 1% and the bottom 90% of incomes has gone from less than 2.6
in the ’70s to more than 3.7 in the new millenium (Atkinson and Piketty, 2010). Indeed, there
are solid reasons to believe that inequality is contributing — now as well as in the aftermath
of the ’29s crises — to depress aggregate demand (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010; Kumhof and
Ranciere, 2010; Stiglitz, 2011). In the model that follows we shall precisely explore such rela-
tionships between the financial and the real domain of the economy, the role played by income
distribution and the impact of monetary and fiscal policies in shaping macrodynamics.
The direct ancestor of this work is the “Keynes meeting Schumpeter” formalism (K+S,
henceforth) presented in Dosi et al. (2010). To that model, we add a banking sector and a
monetary authority setting interest rates and credit lending conditions.
Our approach considers the economy as a complex evolving system, i.e. as an ecology of
heterogenous agents whose far-from-equilibrium interactions continuously change the structure
of the system (more on that in Kirman, 2010; Dosi, 2011; Rosser, 2011). In this framework, the
statistical relationships exhibited by macroeconomic variables should be considered as emergent
properties stemming from microeconomic disequilibrium interactions.
More specifically, we develop an agent-based model that combines Keynesian mechanisms of
demand generation, a “Schumpeterian” innovation-fueled process of growth and Minskian credit
dynamics.
The model, with its evolutionary roots (Nelson and Winter, 1982), belongs to the growing
body of literature on agent-based models (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion,
2008) addressing the properties of macroeconomic dynamics (more on that in Section 2 be-
low)1. The model is grounded on a “realistic” — i.e. rooted in micro empirical evidence —
representation of agents’ behavior, thus providing an explicit “behavioral ”microfoundation of
macro dynamics (Akerlof, 2002). The robustness of the model is checked against its capability
to jointly account for a large set of empirical regularities both at the micro level (e.g. firm size
and growth-rate distributions, productivity dispersions, firm investment patterns) and at the
1For germane ABMs, see Verspagen (2002); Delli Gatti et al. (2005, 2010, 2011); Saviotti and Pyka (2008);
Dawid et al. (2008); Ciarli et al. (2010); Dawid et al. (2011); Ashraf et al. (2011); Cincotti et al. (2010); Gai et al.
(2011). See also Dawid et al. (2012) for a critical comparison of policy analysis in DSGE and agent-based models.
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macro one (e.g. persistent output growth, output volatility, unemployment rates, etc.).
The model portrays an artificial economy composed of capital- and consumption-good firms,
a population of workers, a bank, a Central Bank and a public sector. Capital-good firms per-
form R&D and produce heterogeneous machine tools. Consumption-good firms invest in new
machines and produce a homogeneous consumption good. Firms finance their production and
investment choices employing internal funds as well as credit provided by the banking sector.
The Central Bank fixes the interest rate and determines the credit multiplier. Finally, the public
sector levies taxes on firm profits and worker wages, and pay unemployment benefits.
As in every ABM, the properties of the model have to be analyzed via extensive computer
simulations. We perform our simulations exercises employing a three steps strategy. First, we
empirically validate the model, i.e. we assess whether the statistical properties of artificially
generated microeconomic and macroeconomic data are similar to empirically observed. Second,
we experiment with different income distribution scenarios and study key implications in terms
of macrodynamics. Third, we use the model as a sort of “policy laboratory” exploring the short-
and long-run effects of different fiscal and monetary policies.
In line with Dosi et al. (2010), the model is able to match a long list of macro and micro
empirical regularities. Moreover, the extended version of the K+S model can replicate new
macro and micro stylized facts concerning credit dynamics (including procyclical firm debt and
bankruptcy rates, power-law distributed firm-level “bad debt”, etc.).
We believe that the credit-enhanced K+S model is able to catch salient features underlying
the current as well as previous recessions, the impact of financial factors and the role in them
of income distribution. Indeed, we find that different income distribution regimes heavily affect
macroeconomic performance: more unequal economies are exposed to more severe business
cycles fluctuations, higher unemployment rates, and higher probability of crises.
Moreover, the interactions between credit dynamics and economic fluctuations are strongly
“Minskian”. Higher production and investment levels rise firms’ debt, eroding their net worths
and consequently increasing their credit risk. Banks, in turn, tighten their credit ceilings, which
increase the level of credit rationing in the economy and force firms to curb production and
investment, thus setting the premises for an incoming recession.
On the policy side, the credit-augmented K+S model can be usefully employed to assess the
effects of fiscal and monetary policies under various income distribution scenarios. Simulation
exercises reveal the strong interactions between fiscal and monetary policies on the one side, and
income distribution on the other.
As in Dosi et al. (2010), fiscal policies do not only dampen business cycles, reduce unem-
ployment and the likelihood of experiencing a huge crisis, but in some circumstances are able
to also affect long-term growth. Here, we are able to generalize that result. The more income
distribution is skewed toward profits, the greater the effects of fiscal policies. Conversely, on the
monetary policy side, we find a strong non-linearity in the way interest rates affect macroeco-
nomic dynamics. More specifically, there exists a threshold beyond which increasing the interest
rate implies smaller output growth rates and larger output volatility, unemployment and like-
lihood of crises. Again, the impact of interest rate policies is affected by income distribution:
changes in interest rates have a milder impact on more unequal economy, because higher profit
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rates allow firms to be relatively more independent from bank credit. Similarly, the sensitivity
of real variables to policies affecting credit multipliers falls with higher profit margins.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we outline some of the theoretical
roots of our work. In Section 3 we introduce a credit augmented version of the K+S model.
Simulation results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Some Theoretical Roots
As mentioned, one major root of the model is evolutionary and Schumpeterian: the growth
process is fueled by decentralized uncertainty-ridden activities of innovation and imitation. And
the second major root is Keynesian: the model generically allows for non-Say quasi-equilibria
(we borrow the expression from Krugman, 2011) and growth paths characterized by distinct
growth rates and by varying levels of unemployment.
On the grounds of those two major roots, a central focus of the work that follows regards
the links between financial and real dynamics. Here the reference is the large literature that has
investigated the role of credit in generating business cycles, and in the transmission of monetary-
policy effects to the real economy. The idea that credit heavily affects real variables has had
mixed fortunes in macroeconomics. Although both Keynes (1936) and Fisher (1933) emphasized
the role that credit played in the generation of the Great Depression, the importance of credit
markets was diminished by a long tradition — within both Keynesian and Monetarist camps —
that focused on the money market as the key transmission channel of monetary policies to the
real economy. For instance, according to the textbook IS-LM model, monetary policy operates
through the effects that changes in the quantity of outside money exert on the composition of
agents’ portfolios between money and bonds. In turn, such changes alter the nominal and (in
presence of price-stickiness) real interest rates, thereby changing the level of aggregate invest-
ment. Indeed, the foregoing “money view” of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy
dominated the scene for quite a long time.2 And of course, it is well complemented by micro
claims on the irrelevance of the firm financial structure for real investment decisions (cf. the
(in)famous Modigliani and Miller, 1958, theorem).
In contrast with the above, Gurley and Shaw (1955) long ago proposed a “lending view”
approach to the analysis of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policies.3 In this perspec-
tive, it is the level and composition of lending activities (and not the quantity of money) that is
central in the transmission to the real economy. Such a view is well in tune with Kindleberger
(1978) and Minsky (1975, 1982, 1986), who proposed explanations of crises where i) credit and
money are imperfect substitutes; ii) firms’ financial structures affect the determination of their
investment and production choices; iii) prices do not only allocate resources between alternative
uses, but also determine the profits of the firms, and, through this, their survival or bankruptcy.
In particular, Minsky (1977, 1986) formulated a theory of endogenous business cycles wherein
the dynamics of credit and of financial fragility played major roles. According to this view,
2Incidentally note that this is also the basic transmission mechanism embedded in DSGE models with sticky
prices (see e.g. Woodford, 2003; Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007).
3Hubbard (1995) and Gertler (1988) compare the money vs. the lending view of the monetary transmission
mechanisms. See also Mishkin (1995) for a discussion of the different transmission mechanisms proposed in the
macroeconomic literature.
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every investment burst contains in itself the seeds for the next phase of recession and crisis. An
improvement in the financial robustness of firms, — e.g. due to an increase in the stock of their
liquid assets or to a reduction in the interests paid on debt —, foster production and investment.
The financing of this expansion, however, erodes the internal funds of the firm and shifts its
financial structure towards more external financing. This in turn increases its financial fragility
and thereby the lender’s and borrower’s risk in credit contracts. It follows that lenders tighten
credit standards, and the firm reduces its production and investment because of an increased
fear of bankruptcy.
In the nineties, a good deal of theoretical works has tried to formalize some of the foregoing
insights and to squeeze them to different degrees into an orthodox framework.
A first stream of works on the so called “financial accelerator” literature (see e.g. Bernanke
et al., 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) attempts to microfound some of the intuitions of Minsky’s
and Gurley and Shaw’s analysis (non neutrality of firms’ financial structure, role of borrower
and lender’s risk) plugging asymmetric information into an otherwise Real Business Cycle frame-
work;4 while a second stream (cf. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Bernanke and Blinder, 1988,
among others) does the same without the RBC scaffolding.
Indeed, a common property of asymmetric information between shareholders and managers,
or between lenders and borrowers, is that it generally leads to phenomena such as equity or
credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1992). In such instances, small shocks to firms’ net worth
can have large aggregate consequences on real variables by changing firm bankruptcy risk or the
value of collateral provided in credit contracts.
There are two main channels through which monetary policy effects are transmitted to the
real economy through the credit market (see e.g. Hubbard, 1995). The first channel operates
via the effects that monetary policy actions exerts on the balance sheets of borrowers (“balance
sheet channel”). An increase in the interest rate increases borrowers’ debt burden and reduces
the level of net worth, with (i) rising the cost of external finance; (ii) lower availability of
internal funds for production and investment; and (iii) decreasing collaterals that can be offered
to lenders in credit contracts. The overall result is a reduction in investment and production
expenditures. The other channel, is represented by the effects of monetary policy on the ability
of bank to lend (“bank lending channel”). When banks are subject to reserve requirements, a
monetary contraction drains reserves and can lead to a reduction in banks’ ability to lend (see
e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). As a result, credit allocated to bank-dependent borrowers
may decrease, leading to a curtail in spending of the latter (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1988).
Both the balance sheet and bank lending channels have received empirical support from
time-series studies (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Kashyap et al., 1993; Lown and Morgan,
2006; Claessens et al., 2009) as well as from cross-sectional ones (e.g. Fazzari et al., 1988; Gertler
and Gilchrist, 1994; Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Leary, 2009), including studies encompassing the
last recession (Black and Rosen, 2011; Ciccarelli et al., 2010).
Financial accelerator models constitute an important advance in the understanding of the
role of credit in the generation of business cycle fluctuations. At the same time, the major limit
of many of them is that they are nested into a representation of the real side of the economy
4A follow up to this type of models is represented by the recent works trying to include financial accelerator
mechanisms and financial intermediaries into a DSGE-type framework, see e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
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(the RBC or, more recently, the DSGE framework) with the full neglect of aggregate demand
issues, the censorship of any heterogeneity across agents, and no possibility of endogenous credit
cycles. On the contrary, in the model that follows, we shall fully take on board the two channels
of “financial acceleration” avoiding all these drawbacks.
In contrast to financial accelerator models, aggregate demand plays a key role in the strand of
literature on credit and business cycles nearer to the structuralist and post-keynesian traditions
(cf. Taylor and O’Connell, 1985; Chiarella et al., 1999; Palley, 1994; Keen, 1995; Fazzari et al.,
2008; Charpe et al., 2009, among others). Models developed in this framework are able to
generate endogenous cycles with Minskian features. In particular, Palley (1994), Keen (1995),
and Charpe et al. (2009) study the interactions between debt and income distribution in a
Goodwin-type model of business cycles, bearing in that respect a good deal of similarity with
our model. On the other hand, they all structure their models as systems of macro-dynamics
equations describing the interaction between the financial and the real part of the economy.
Conversely, in the model below and in tune with the macro agent-based literature (Delli Gatti
et al, 2005, Russo et al. 2007, Cincotti et al., Ahsraf et al., 2011), finance-real interactions and
the possible ensuing fluctuations are nested over an ecology of multiple heterogeneous agents. In
this respect, our model is rather close to the financial fragility model of Delli Gatti et al., (2005),
in turn building on the insights of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993). Unlike this model, however,
we ground our financial-real dynamics on a “Keynes plus Schumpeter” root, with endogenous
technical change (in analogy with Russo et al., 2007; Delli Gatti et al., 2011) and also (partly)
endogenous generation of aggregate effective demand.
3 The Credit-Augmented K+S Model
Let us now present the model, an extended version of Dosi et al. (2010), to which we refer
for more details. The model portrays an economy composed of a machine-producing sector
made of F1 firms (denoted by the subscript i), a consumption-good sector made of F2 firms
(denoted by the subscript j), LS consumers/workers, a bank, a Central Bank and a public
sector. Capital-good firms invest in R&D and produce heterogeneous machines. Consumption-
good firms combine machine tools bought by capital-good firms and labor in order to produce
a final product for consumers. Firms deposit in the bank their cash flows. The bank provides
credit to firms. Credit is allotted to firms on a pecking-order basis according to their net worth.
The Central Bank affects the supply of loans and the actual dynamics of debt of the firms in
the economy fixing the interest rare and the credit multiplier. Finally, the public sector levies
taxes on firms’ profits and pays unemployment benefits.
In what follows, we will briefly describe the bank-augmented K+S model paying particularly
attention to the dynamics of the credit market (cf. Section 3.4).
3.1 The Timeline of Events
In any given time period (t), the following microeconomic decisions take place in sequential
order:
1. Policy variables are fixed (e.g. a Central Bank setting the interest rate at which it lends
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to the bank and the reserve requirement of the latter; the “Government” setting tax rates
and unemployment benefits, etc.).
2. Machine-tool firms perform R&D trying to discover new products and more efficient pro-
duction techniques and to imitate the production technology and the products of their
competitors. Capital-good firms advertise their machines to consumption-good firms.
3. Consumption-good firms decide how much to produce and invest. If investment is positive,
consumption-good firms choose their supplier, send their orders and pay for the machines.
When internal funds are not enough to finance production and investment plans, firms
borrow (up to a ceiling) from the bank.
4. Total credit provided by the bank to each firm is determined.
5. In both industries firms hire workers according to their production plans if below their
credit ceiling or at the ceiling otherwise and start producing.
6. Imperfectly competitive consumption-good market opens. The market shares of firms
evolve according to their price competitiveness.
7. Firms in both sectors compute their net cash flow, pay back their due loans to the bank
to the extent that they have cash flow to do that and deposit their savings, if any.
8. Entry and exit take place. In both sectors firms with near-zero market shares and/or neg-
ative net worth are eschewed from their industry and replaced by new firms (for simplicity,
we keep the number of firms fixed; any dead firm is replaced by a new one; and entrant
firms are random copies of incumbent ones).
9. Machines ordered at the beginning of the period are delivered and become part of the
capital stock at time t+ 1.
At the end of each time step, aggregate variables (e.g. GDP, investment, employment) are
computed, summing over the corresponding microeconomic quantities.
3.2 The Capital-Good Industry
The technology of capital-good firms5 evolves along the vintages of produced machine-tools.
Each firm specific generation of machine-tools has indeed a distinct production cost and distinct
labour productivity for the user. Machine selling prices are set with a mark-up rule6 over
production costs. The quality of each vintage is measured by the productivity of machines in
the consumption-good sector.
Innovation and imitation are costly processes: firms invest in R&D a fraction of their revenues
and hire researchers at the current market wage.
Both innovation and imitation follow a two-steps stochastic process. In the first step, the
resources allocated to search determine in probability whether the events “innovation” and “im-
itation” are drawn. Note that the newly discovered capital goods might be a “failed innovation”,
5A detailed description of the capital- and consumption-good sector dynamics is in Appendix A.
6This in line with survey data evidence on firm pricing behavior (see e.g. Fabiani et al., 2006).
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because production costs might be higher and/or user efficiency might be lower than the cur-
rently manufactured machines. Indeed, at the second stochastic stage, each firm draws the
characteristics of the would-be machine and decide whether to keep on producing the current
generation of machines or to switch to the new vintage, by evaluating the possible trade-off
between production costs and productive efficiencies (of course, it could be also that the new
machine is both cheaper and more efficient, or more expensive and less efficient). Once the
machine tool is chosen, capital-good firms try to reach their customers under conditions of
imperfect information: hence, we assume that they send a “brochure” with the price and the
productivity of their machines to both their historical clients and a random sample of potential
new customers.
3.3 The Consumption-Good Industry
Consumption-good firms produce an homogenous good using capital (i.e. their stock of ma-
chines) and labor under constant returns to scale. Firms plan their production according to
adaptive demand expectations.7 The desired level of production depends on the expected de-
mand as well as on the desired inventories (i.e. a fraction of the expected demand) and the
actual stock. If the desired capital stock — dependent on the desired level of production — is
higher than the current one, firms invest in order to expand their production capacity.
Consumption-good firms have a capital stock composed of heterogenous machines with differ-
ent productivities associated with them. Firms decide whether to scrap their machines following
a payback period rule, that is they assess whether the substitution cost of any current machine,
i.e. the price of a new one, can be recovered in a given number of years by by cutting produc-
tion costs (new machines have lower unit production cost than incumbent ones). In this way,
technical change and capital-good prices affect the replacement decisions of consumption-good
firms.8 The latter choose their capital-good supplier comparing the price and productivity of
those machine tools which they know via the brochures they receive. Machine production is a
time-consuming process: consumption-good firms receive the ordered machines at the end of the
period. 9 Gross investment of each firm is the sum of expansion and replacement investment.
Aggregate investment is just the sum of the investments of all consumption good firms.
Given their current stock of machines, consumption-good firms compute their average pro-
ductivity and unit costs of production. Firms fix prices applying a variable mark-up (µj) over the
latter. The variation of such mark-ups are regulated by the evolution of firms’ market shares
(fj): firms raise (cut) mark-up whenever the growth rate of their market shares is positive
(negative):
µj(t) = µj(t− 1)
(
1 + υ
fj(t− 1)− fj(t− 2)
fj(t− 2)
)
, (1)
7In Dosi et al. (2006) we checked the robustness of this assumption employing more sophisticated expectation-
formation rules. We found that increasing the computational capabilities of firms does not have much influence on
the dynamics of the economy and in particular does not improve either the average growth rates or the stability
of the economy.
8This in line with a large body of empirical papers (e.g., Feldstein and Foot, 1971; Eisner, 1972; Goolsbee,
1998) showing that replacement investment is typically not proportional to the capital stock.
9The presence of gestation-lag effects in firm investments expenditures is supported by a large body of empirical
literature (see e.g. Del Boca et al., 2008).
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with 0 6 υ 6 1. This process in turn implies that firms’ mark-up rates fluctuate around a sort
of peg represented by the initial mark-up rate µ¯(0). Thus, by tuning up and down the level of
such initial mark-up rate one can vary the long-term income distribution between wages and
profits. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we shall indeed make extensive exercises studying how different
mark-up rates affect the aggregate dynamics of an economy, and how the effects of different
fiscal and monetary policies vary across different levels of this variable.
Prices are one of the key determinants of firms’ competitiveness. The other ones are the
levels of unfilled demand. If firms cannot fully satisfy their customers, their competitiveness is
accordingly reduced.
Market shares evolve according to a replicator-type dynamics operating under conditions of
imperfect information,10 so that even if the product is homogeneous, firms may charge different
prices. In such dynamics, firms with above-average competitiveness expand their market shares,
while those below shrink (or even die).
3.4 Firm Credit Demand and The Banking Sector
We assume a banking sector with only one commercial bank (or n identical ones) that gathers
deposits and provides credit to firms. In what follows, we first describe how credit demand is
calculated by each firm. Next, we discuss how total credit is determined by the bank, and how
credit is allocated to each firm.
Consumption-good firms have to finance their investments as well as their production, as
they advance worker wages. In line with a growing number of theoretical and empirical papers
(e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1992; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Hubbard, 1998), and with sheer
intuition, we assume imperfect capital markets. This implies that the financial structure of
firms matters (external funds are more expensive than internal ones) and firms may be credit
rationed. Consumption-good firms finance production and investment using first their net worth.
If the latter does not fully cover total production and investment costs, firms borrow external
funds from the bank. Total production and investment expenditures of firms must therefore
satisfy the resource constraint
cj(t)Qj(t) + EI
d
j (t) +RI
d
j (t) ≤ NWj(t− 1) +Debj(t) (2)
where cj(t)Qj(t) is total production costs, EI
d
j (t) is expansion investment, RI
d
j (t) is replacement
investment and Debj(t) is the credit demand by the firm. Firms have limited borrowing capacity:
the ratio between debt and sales cannot exceed a maximum threshold: the maximum credit
demand of each firm is limited by its past sales according to a loan-to-value ratio 0 ≤ λ ≤ ∞.
More precisely, credit demand of the firm in period t must satisfy the constraint:
Debj(t) ≤ λSj(t− 1) (3)
Equations 2 and 3 introduce a “balance sheet” effect in the model (cf. Section 2) as they imply
that an increase in either firm net worth or in past sales may yield an increase of firm production
and investment.
10See Rotemberg (2008) for a survey of the empirical literature on consumers’ imperfect price knowledge.
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The maximum credit available in the economy is set through a credit multiplier rule. More
precisely, in each period the bank is allowed by an unmodeled Central Bank to grant credit
above the funds obtained through deposits from firms (and equal to their past net worth, NWj),
according to a multiplier k. The maximum credit available in the economy at time t, MTC(t)
is:
MTC(t) = k
N∑
j=1
NWj(t− 1), k > 0. (4)
Total credit is allocated to each firm in the consumption-good sector on a pecking order basis,
according to the ratio between net worth and sales,
NWj(t)
Sj(t)
. More precisely, the bank first ranks
firms on the basis on their net worth-to-sales ratio, and starts to satisfy the demand of the first
firm in the rank, then the second one, etc. If the total credit available is insufficient to fulfill
the demand of all the firms in the pecking order list, some firms that are lower in the pecking
order are credit rationed. Note that only firms that are not credit-rationed can fully satisfy their
investment plans employing their stock of liquid assets first and then their borrowing capacity.
Conversely, the total demand for credit can also be lower than the total notional supply. In
this case all credit demand of firms is fulfilled and there are no credit-rationed firms. It follows
that in any period the stock of loans of the bank satisfies the following constraint:
N∑
j=1
Debj(t) = Loan(t) 6MTC(t). (5)
Equations 4 and 5 imply that the “balance sheet channel” and “bank lending channel” interact
in the model. This is because the distribution of firm cash flows affect both the internal financing
possibilities of production and investment and, through deposits, the provision of bank credit
in the next period. In Section 4.3 we shall see how different monetary policies (interest rates,
credit multipliers) impact on the foregoing interaction, and via the latter, transmit their effects
to the economy.
The profits of the bank are equal to interest rate receipts from redeemable loans and from
interests on reserves held at the Central Bank minus interests paid on deposits. Furthermore,
the bank fixes its deposit (rD) and loan (rL) rates applying respectively a mark-down and a
mark-up on the Central Bank rate r.11
rD = (1− ψD)r, 0 ≤ ψD ≤ 1 (6)
rL = (1 + ψL)r, 0 ≤ ψL ≤ 1 (7)
3.5 The Labor Market
We do not impose any assumption of labor-market clearing: as a consequence involuntary unem-
ployment as well as labor rationing are the rule rather than the exception. The aggregate labor
demand is computed summing up the labor demand of capital- and consumption-good firms.
The aggregate supply is exogenous and inelastic. Aggregate employment is then the minimum
11This formalization of the credit market implies that banks respond to changes in aggregate credit conditions
by changing non-price terms of the loan (loan size in this case) rather than the interest rate. This is in line with
recent empirical evidence (e.g. from Loan Officer Opinion Surveys, see Lown and Morgan, 2006).
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between labor demand and supply. The wage is set according to:
w(t) = w(t− 1)
(
1 + ψ1
∆AB(t)
AB(t− 1) + ψ2
∆cpi(t)
cpi(t− 1) + ψ3
∆U(t)
U(t− 1)
)
, (8)
where AB is the average labor productivity, cpi is the consumer price index, and U is the
unemployment rate. The wage rate is determined by institutional and market factors, with both
indexation mechanisms upon consumption prices and average productivity, on the one hand, and,
adjustments to unemployment rates, on the others. In Dosi et al. (2010), we explore different
institutional regimes governing the relative importance of price, productivity and unemployment
for wage setting. Indeed, the major qualitative properties of the model considered here are quite
robust to regime variations. Hence, here, for simplicity we restrict the analysis to a regime
wherein wage just grows with average productivity.12
3.6 Consumption, Taxes, and Public Expenditures
The public sector levies taxes on firm profits and worker wages (or on profits only) and pays
to unemployed workers a subsidy, that is a fraction of the current market wage. In fact, taxes
and subsidies are the fiscal instruments that contribute to the aggregate demand management.
All wages and subsidies are consumed: the aggregate consumption (C) is the sum of income of
both employed and unemployed workers, as the model satisfies the standard national account
identities: the sum of value added of capital- and consumption-goods firms (Y ) equals their
aggregate production since in our simplified economy there are no intermediate goods, and that
in turn coincides with the sum of aggregate consumption, investment and change in inventories
(∆N):
F1∑
i=1
Qi(t) +
F2∑
j=1
Qj(t) = Y (t) ≡ C(t) + I(t) + ∆N(t). (9)
The micro decisions of a multiplicity of heterogenous, adaptive agents and their interaction
mechanisms is the explicit microfoundation of the dynamics for all aggregate variables of inter-
est (e.g. output, investment, employment, etc.). It is important to emphasize, however, that
the aggregate properties of the economy do not bear any apparent isomorphism with micro ad-
justment rules outlined above. And a fundamental consequence is also that any “representative
agent” compression of micro heterogeneity is likely to offer a very distorted account of both
what agents do and of the collective outcomes of their actions — indeed, well in tune with the
arguments of Kirman (1992) and Solow (2008).
4 Simulation Results
Similarly to Dosi et al. (2010), we investigated the micro and macro properties of the model
described in the previous section through extensive computer simulations. We undertake the
simulation analysis of the model in two complementary steps. First, we identify a “benchmark”
12In these circumstances, since firms’ average mark-up is pegged to the initial one (see Eq. 1 and discussion
thereafter), this regime is also characterized by a zero average inflation rate. We experimented with regimes
wherein wage move also as a function of unemployment rates. All the properties discussed below, robustly hold.
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Figure 1: Log of GDP time series.
setup for which the model is empirically validated, i.e. it is able to replicate a wide spectrum
of microeconomic and macroeconomic stylized facts. Next, we turn to “policy experiments”,
by identifying sets of parameters (e.g. the interest rate, the credit multiplier, the tax rate)
whose values capture different policies. Under the “policy experiment mode”, in Dosi et al.
(2010), we studied the consequences of different “innovation regimes” — and related policies
— and their interaction with (Keynesian) demand management. In this paper, we turn to
experiments with different income distribution regimes and different fiscal and monetary policies,
and we analyze their impact on a long list of indicators including output growth rates, output
volatility, frequency of full employment and unemployment rates, likelihood of crises (defined as
number of episodes with output growth rates lower than −3%).13 All results presented in the
following sections refer to Montecarlo averages over 50 iterations of T=600 time steps each.14
The benchmark parameterization is reported in Appendix B.
4.1 Empirical Validation
Let us now consider the results of the empirical validation of the model. The macro and micro
stylized facts robustly replicated by the model are the same statistical regularities produced by
and discussed at much greater length in Dosi et al. (2010) plus a few other finance-related ones.15
So the model is able to generate macroeconomic series of output, consumption and aggregate
13Interestingly, many statistical regularities concerning the structure of the economy (e.g. firm size distri-
butions, fatness of firms growth rates, etc.) appear to hold across an ample parameter range, under positive
technological progress, even when policies undergo the changes we study in the following.
14Preliminary tests show that results of the model are significantly robust to changes in the initial conditions
for the microeconomic variables of the model. In addition, they show that, for the majority of the statistics under
study, Montecarlo distributions are sufficiently symmetric and unimodal. This justifies the use of across-run
averages as meaningful indicators. All our results do not dramatically change if one increases Montecarlo sample
sizes.
15See Stock and Watson (1999); Napoletano et al. (2006); Claessens et al. (2009) for the empirical properties
of the macroeconomic time series; and Dosi (2007) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for an account of the main
stylized facts concerning firm and productivity dynamics.
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investment characterized by self-sustained growth patterns (see also Figure 1) and by persistent
fluctuations (see also Figure 2 and Table 1). Moreover, aggregate investment is more volatile
than GDP whereas consumption is less volatile. In addition, the model replicates the empirically
observable co-movements between a large set of macro time series and GDP (net investment and
consumption pro-cyclical coincident, inflation pro-cyclical and lagging, counter-cyclical mark-up
rates, etc.).
At the same time, at the microeconomic level, the model matches a wide set of stylized
facts concerning firm dynamics (including right-skewed distribution of firm sizes, fat-tailed dis-
tributions of firm growth rates, wide and persistent productivity differences across firms, lumpy
investment dynamics).
However, the credit-enhanced K+S model is also able to match the empirical evidence about
the credit dynamics (see Claessens et al., 2009). As shown in Table 1, the model generates a
highly pro-cyclical aggregate firm debt dynamics. Second, cross-correlation values shed light on
the characteristics of the credit dynamics underneath the business cycles endogenously generated
by the model, which has strong “Minskian” features (see e.g. Minsky, 1986). Indeed, bank
deposits (equal to total firms’ net-worth) are counter-cyclical and lagging GDP. Supplied credit
displays the same cyclical behavior and interestingly it is positively correlated with future values
of GDP (cf. Table 1). This is in line with empirical evidence and it indicates that expansion in
supplied credit anticipates future expansions in aggregate output.
Third, the net worth to sales ratio (proxying credit rating in the model) is counter-cyclical
and lagging, whereas bankruptcy rates are pro-cyclical and coincident.
These patterns are coherent with the characteristics of the “credit cycles” observed in real
data (see Lown and Morgan, 2006; Leary, 2009). Higher production and investment expenditures
induce a rise in firms debt. In turn, this gradually erodes firms’ net cash flows. Average
credit riskiness of firms increases, and banks tighten credit (which lead to higher rates of credit
rationing). Higher credit constraints on firms in turn reduce investment expenditures and set
13
Series (Bpf) Output (Bpf)
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
GDP -0.0237 0.2704 0.6116 0.8903 1 0.8903 0.6116 0.2704 -0.0237
(0.0133) (0.0108) (0.0064) (0.0021) (0) (0.0021) (0.0064) (0.0108) (0.0133)
Total Firm Debt 0.2181 0.3991 0.5726 0.6931 0.7178 0.6321 0.4568 0.2376 0.0259
(0.0216) (0.0207) (0.0194) (0.0179) (0.0166) (0.0154) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0151)
Bank Deposits -0.3420 -0.2646 -0.1603 -0.0599 0.0158 0.0654 0.1003 0.1326 0.1639
(0.0219) (0.0238) (0.0241) (0.0220) (0.0188) (0.0165) (0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0138)
Credit Supplied -0.3420 -0.2646 -0.1603 -0.0599 0.0158 0.0654 0.1003 0.1326 0.1639
(0.0219) (0.0238) (0.0241) (0.0220) (0.0188) (0.0165) (0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0138)
Net Worth to Sales Ratio -0.3571 -0.5081 -0.6150 -0.6386 -0.5599 -0.3946 -0.1851 0.0184 0.1768
(0.0200) (0.0207) (0.0216) (0.0207) (0.0179) (0.0148) (0.0136) (0.0142) (0.0147)
Bankruptcy Rate -0.0112 0.0645 0.1656 0.2721 0.3522 0.3757 0.3305 0.2292 0.1042
(0.0146) (0.0199) (0.0243) (0.0258) (0.0234) (0.0175) (0.0106) (0.0098) (0.0149)
Table 1: Correlation structure for output and credit structure. Bpf: bandpass filtered (6,32,12)
series. Monte-Carlo simulation standard errors in parentheses
.
100
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Ta
il 
D
is
tri
bu
tio
n
Bad Debt
 
 
Simulation Data
Figure 3: Cross-sectional distribution of firms bad debt.
the premises for the incoming recessionary phase.
At the micro level, we have analyzed bankruptcy rates. The recent evidence on this issue
(e.g. Fujiwara, 2004; Di Guilmi et al., 2004) has pointed out that the distribution by firm of
the amounts of “bad” debt at the time of bankruptcy is highly skewed to the right and heavy
tailed, displaying a power-law type behavior. This implies that episodes of large bankruptcies
are statistically more frequent than what would be predicted by a normal distribution. As
Figure 3 clearly shows, this empirical evidence is well replicated by our model. Moreover, we
also find, in tune with the empirics, that the temporal distribution of bankruptcies is right
skewed, displaying clustering in time (indeed the “crises”).
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Figure 4: Frequency of full employment states the mark-up rates (95% confidence bands in gray).
Figure 5: Standard deviation of GDP growth rate and the mark-up rates (95% confidence bands
in gray).
Figure 6: Likelihood of crises in GDP and the mark-up rate (95% confidence bands in gray). Note:
Crises are defined as episodes with growth rates lower than −3%.
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Figure 7: Unemployment rate and the mark-up rate (95% confidence bands in gray).
Figure 8: Average GDP growth rate and the mark-up rate (95% confidence bands in gray).
Figure 9: Frequency of full employment in the benchmark scenario (solid line) and in the scenario
with zero fiscal policy (dashed line; 95% confidence bands in gray).
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4.2 Income Distribution, Fiscal Policies, Growth and Business Cycles
The role played by mark-up rates in the dynamics of the model is twofold. On the one hand, the
level of the mark-up determines the profits of the firms, and thus the level of internal resources
available to finance production and investment expenditures. Higher mark-ups imply — ceteris
paribus — higher profits and thus a lower dependence of firms on the external financing provided
by banks. On the other hand, the mark-up regulates the distribution of income between profits
and wages. Since aggregate consumption in the model is equal to total wages, higher mark-up
rates result in a lower level of demand for final-good firms.
In light of these contrasting effects we explore the impact of different income distribution
regimes on aggregate dynamics by varying the level of the mark-ups themselves. Figure 4 shows
that the time the economy spends in full employment is inversely related to the mark-up rates.
The more the functional distribution of income is biased towards profits, the less the economy
spend time in full employment.
Figures 5, 6 and 7 reveal some further interesting features of such “non-Say” economies.
First, the volatility of GDP growth (see Fig. 5) is positively related to the mark-up rate.
Second, the incidence of crises (cf. Fig. 6) and relatively high unemployment states (cf. Fig. 7)
are also higher.
The above patterns notwithstanding, the long-term average GDP growth rates (Figure 8)
are only marginally (negatively) affected by the levels of mark-ups. Note however that the result
is obtained in the “benchmark” scenario, which includes a positive level of fiscal redistributive
policy (tax rates on profit to 40% redistributed as unemployment subsidies). If we repeat the
same experiment with tax and subsidy rates both set to zero (see Figure 9), a pattern starkly
emerges: if fiscal policies are absent, the adverse effects of the mark-up rate on the frequency of
full employment states are strengthened.
The above findings generalize previous results from Dosi et al. (2010) on the role of fiscal
policy in sustaining the long-term growth: the effectiveness of fiscal policy indeed increases
with the mark-up. When the profit margin is very high, redistributive fiscal policies become
a necessary condition for long-run growth. As in Dosi et al. (2010), redistributive policies act
as a parachute when the economy experiences unemployment, by avoiding excessive falls in
consumption demand due to the reduced incomes of unemployed workers. Moreover, investment
expectations are linked to consumer demand in the model. Hence, more stable consumption
demand profiles enhance the incentives to firms to invest in new capacity and in new machines.
When the mark-up rate is low, the distribution of income is obviously in favor of wages. This
implies a high propensity to consume and a high “investment accelerator”. As a consequence,
the economy is most of the time in full employment. In contrast, when the profit margin is high,
redistributive fiscal policies sustain an otherwise depressed consumer demand. This guarantees
a higher long-run rate of growth.
Let us turn to a deeper investigation of the interactions between fiscal policies and income
distribution regimes. More precisely, we define three scenarios according to the level of the initial
mark-up rate (0.10; 0.20; 0.40) in the consumption-good sector, and we change simultaneously
both the tax (t) (on profits only) and the unemployment-subsidy rates (wu) in the range between
0.15 and 0.90. Notice that, all the fiscal policy experiments discussed below have been performed
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under conditions on average of balanced-budget of government finances. Results are reported
in Figures 10-15.
In all the three mark-up scenarios, the average growth rate is not significantly affected by
changes in both the tax rates and the unemployment-subsidy (see Fig. 10). In contrast, the
volatility of the economy and the incidence of crises are strongly reduced by higher unemploy-
ment subsidy/tax rates (cf. Figs 11 and 14). Notice also that the effects of fiscal policies change
according to the mark-up scenarios. Indeed, the capability of stronger redistributive policies to
dampen business-cycle fluctuations increase when income distribution is more skewed toward
profits.
The same patterns emerge also on the labor market side. If income distribution strongly
favor wages (i.e. µ¯(0) = 0.10), the economy spends most of the time in full employment for
every possible couples of tax and unemployment-subsidy (see Fig. 13). Of course this results
in an average unemployment rate close to zero (cf. Fig. 12). For higher mark-up levels (i.e.
µ¯(0) = 0.20; 0.40), higher doses of redistributive fiscal policies are required to stabilize the
economy toward its full employment states.
Somewhat counterintuitively, the average bankruptcy rates (Fig. 15) are positively influenced
by higher levels of tax and unemployment subsidies. This occurs because stronger redistributive
fiscal policies foster consumption demand and in turn firm investment, leading (extrapolatively
adaptive) firms to build up what eventually will turn out to be excess productive capacity.
Overall, the results obtained in the three profit margin scenarios confirm the importance of
the interactions between income distribution regimes and redistributive fiscal policies. In fact,
expansionary policies happen to be even more needed under profit-biased income distributions:
more or less the opposite to what EMU countries are currently trying to do!
Let us now study the effects of monetary policies.
4.3 Monetary Policy
To repeat, the level of mark-up rate has contrasting effects on firms behaviors. On one hand,
higher mark-ups imply — other things being equal — higher net profits and thus less dependence
on internal financing. On the other hand, they imply lower wage shares in the GDP and weaken
consumption demand, with a consequent lower incentive for firms to invest. Thus, similarly to
fiscal policy experiments, we ran experiments on monetary policy variables for different values
of the initial mark-up rate (0.10, 0.20, 0.40), in order to explore the effects of monetary policies
under different income distribution regimes. We focus on the impact of two different policy
instruments, first, the interest rate and, second, reserve requirements and thus credit multipliers.
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Figure 10: Average GDP growth rate and the tax/unemployment-subsidy rates (95% confidence
bands in gray).
Figure 11: Standard deviation of GDP growth rate and the tax/unemployment-subsidy rates (95%
confidence bands in gray).
Figure 12: Unemployment rate and the tax/unemployment-subsidy rates (95% confidence bands
in gray).
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Figure 13: Frequency of full employment states and tax/unemployment-subsidy rates (95% confi-
dence bands in gray).
Figure 14: Bankruptcy rate and tax/unemployment-subsidy rates (95% confidence bands in gray).
Figure 15: Likelihood of crises in GDP growth and tax/unemployment-subsidy rates (95% confi-
dence bands in gray).
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Interest Rates
As already mentioned, in this model we focus on a regime wherein inflation is on average zero, and
we therefore rule out inflation targeting concerns. In addition, we make the extreme assumption
that the Central Bank sets the initial level of the baseline interest rate and commits itself to
keep it fixed throughout the simulation.
Figures 16 and 17 show the average GDP growth rate and its standard deviation as a function
of the baseline interest rate r, for different mark-up levels. Both average growth and volatility
are completely unaffected by changes in the interest rate in the high mark-up scenario (0.40).
In contrast, significant effects emerge in the “benchmark” and low mark-up scenarios (re-
spectively 0.20 and 0.10; see Appendix B for benchmark parameterization). In these cases, the
system displays two phases (i.e. two regimes). The interest rate does not change average growth
and volatility up to a threshold above which average growth start decreasing and volatility in-
creasing with the interest rate (see Figures 16 and 17). In addition, the threshold above which
the interest rate affects growth and volatility decreases with the mark-up level.
The patterns displayed by other real variables in the model are similar to the ones just
described. Interest rates have no effects on the average unemployment rate (Figure 19) and on
the likelihood of crises (Figure 18), if the mark-up is very high (0.40). At lower levels (0.20,
0.10), interest rates affect unemployment and the likelihood of crises above a given threshold
value, with both unemployment and the probability of crises steadily increasing with interest
rates.
The general picture is that, when mark-up rates are sufficiently low, changes in interest
rates may affect real dynamics in a significant way. In particular high interest rates bring
the economy on a low growth trajectory, characterized by wide fluctuations in output and high
average unemployment rates. And this outcome is strongly correlated to the fall in the frequency
of periods the economy spends in full employment (see Figure 20).
The analysis of bankruptcy rates adds further elements to the picture. First, in line with
the results discussed in Section 4.2, average bankruptcy rates decrease with the mark-up rate,
for any level of the interest rate (see Figure 21). Second, bankruptcy rates are not affected by
the interest rate for high mark-up rates (0.40), while at lower levels of mark-up (0.20, 0.10) they
steadily increase with the interest rate. It follows that — differently from what observed in fiscal
policy experiments — high volatility and incidence of crises are now positively correlated to the
bankruptcy rate.
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Figure 16: Average GDP growth and the interest rate (95% confidence bands in gray).
Figure 17: Standard deviation of GDP growth rate and the interest rate (95% confidence bands in
gray).
Figure 18: Likelihood of crises in GDP growth and the interest rate (95% confidence bands in
gray).
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Figure 19: Unemployment rate and the interest rate (95% confidence bands in gray).
Figure 20: Frequency of full employment states and the interest rate (95% confidence bands in
gray).
Figure 21: Bankruptcy rate and the interest rate (95% confidence bands in gray).
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Credit Multipliers
How do the above results change when one varies the maximum credit available in the economy?
Figure 22 shows average GDP growth as a function of the credit multiplier in turn determined by
reserve requirements imposed by the Central Bank in different mark-up scenarios.16 Similarly to
the interest rate experiment, the sensitivity of real variables to changes in the credit multiplier
decreases with mark-up rates. It is null in the case of high mark-ups (0.40), and it is the highest
for a level of mark-up equal to 0.10. Let us then focus on this latter scenario. Figure 22 shows
that the relation between average GDP growth and the credit multiplier is quite asymmetric.
Namely, credit “contractions” negatively affect growth. In contrast, expanding total credit
above a certain threshold does not lead to significant improvements in growth performance.
Also average volatility is significantly affected by changes in the credit multiplier (cf. Figure
23) and, interestingly, the relation is U-shaped. Volatility is the highest for low and high values
of the ratio, while it is minimized for intermediate values. This is due to the effects that this
instrument has on the credit supply. Lower levels of the multiplier reduce the availability of
loans, forcing firms to rely more on their highly volatile net profits. At the opposite end, much
higher credit multipliers allow firms to explosively finance production and investment, eventually
leading to overproduction and overinvestment episodes.
This U-shaped pattern is even more evident in the analysis of the likelihood of crises (see
Fig. 24). Under intermediate values, such a likelihood is strikingly low.
These results uncover another interesting property of the model: raising too much the credit
multiplier brings only small contributions to the long-run growth of the economy. At the same
time it leads to wider fluctuations and to a higher incidence of crises. In contrast, decreasing too
much the multiplier increases both volatility and crises, and also reduces the growth prospects
of the economy.
The relationship between credit multiplier and business cycle fluctuations also affects the
unemployment rate. Increases in the credit multiplier yield to a dramatic fall of the unemploy-
ment rate up to a threshold above which the higher volatility of the economy is reflected also in
increasing levels of unemployment (see Figs. 25 and 26).
Monetary policy effects: a discussion
Let us now summarize as well as provide some general interpretations of the above findings. First,
the results show deep interactions between monetary policies and patterns of income distribution
between wages and profits. In particular the lack of sensitivity to changes in monetary policy
variables at high mark-up rates, indicates the possible emergence of a sort of liquidity traps.17
Increasing mark-ups raises the availability of internal funds to firms. At the same time, lower
wage shares imply lower aggregate consumption propensity.18 Via demand expectations, this
leads to a lower propensity to invest into the expansion of the productive capacity. When mark-
16The following discussion focuses on the effects of credit multipliers. However, results do not change if one
changes credit ceilings to single firms instead of the maximum credit supply available in the economy.
17This type of liquidity trap is of course different from the standard Keynesian one. There agents prefer to
keep their funds as money rather than investing them into bonds. Here, instead firms prefer to keep their funds
as money instead of investing into activities such as production and investment.
18In our model, to repeat, we make the extreme assumption that all wages are consumed and all profits are
either invested or saved. However, our conclusions qualitatively hold as long as, in good Keynesian fashion, the
propensity to consume out of profits is lower that that out of wages.
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Figure 22: Average GDP growth and the credit multiplier rate (95% confidence bands in gray).
Figure 23: Standard deviation of GDP growth rate and the credit multiplier rate (95% confidence
bands in gray).
Figure 24: Likelihood of crises in GDP growth and the credit multiplier rate (95% confidence bands
in gray).
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Figure 25: Unemployment rate and the credit multiplier rate (95% confidence bands in gray).
Figure 26: Frequency of full employment states and the credit multiplier rate (95% confidence
bands in gray).
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ups are too high, the second force becomes dominant, and therefore firms have plenty of idle
funds which are kept as money (more precisely deposits), rather then being invested. In this
case, monetary policies can do little to influence the economy, as the low propensity to invest
implies also low incentives to raise debt. Second, even when mark-ups are low (and thus the
sensitivity to monetary policy interventions is in principle high) there are regions of monetary
policy ineffectiveness: our results indicate the existence of threshold values below which changes
in interest rate or in the credit multiplier have small or no effect on real variables.
Furthermore, the different role played by interest rate vs. credit quantity instruments (credit
multipliers) can be explained on the grounds of the different transmission mechanisms through
which these instruments operate.
Consider interest rates. First, the level of interest rate affects the real sector through a
“balance sheet channel”. By impacting on firms’ costs, the levels of interest rates determine
firms’ net cash flows available to finance production and investment plans and symmetrically
the requirements of external financing. Second, by determining bank’s and firms’ profits, interest
rates directly affect the amount of funds redistributed from the real sector to the banking sector.
Bank’s profits are added to bank reserves, and therefore are not reinvested into credit to firms.
It is straightforward that high interest rates imply — ceteris paribus — lower net profits of
firms and therefore — via the “bank lending channel” — a lower amount of resources available
to finance production and investment expenditures.
Credit multipliers influence too the total level of credit available in the economy. However,
by not impacting on firms’ costs they do not alter the dynamics of internal funds and the demand
for credit of individual firm. This explains also why credit multipliers basically affect the growth
of the economy only on the “downside”, when the squeeze on credit availability induces a sort
of systemic rationing of the economy.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have explored the interactions between the financial and real sides of an evo-
lutionary agent-based economy under different mixes of fiscal and monetary policies. After
showing the ability of the model to reproduce the main stylized facts concerning credit dynam-
ics at the micro and macro levels, we analyzed the effects of fiscal and monetary policies under
different conditions characterizing the distribution of income between wages and profits. Our
results emphasize the high interdependence between macro policies and the patterns of income
distribution. In presence of a high profit bias, redistributive fiscal policies are able to dampen
business cycle fluctuations and to keep the economy close to full employment. In line with the
result shown in Dosi et al. (2010) we find that some fiscal policies are in any case necessary
to keep the system away from a stagnant long-term trajectory, even in presence of abundant
“Schumpeterian” opportunities of innovation.
Also the effects of monetary policy are highly dependent on income distribution. In particu-
lar, monetary policy turns out to be effective only in regimes characterized by low profit-to-GDP
ratios. In contrast, high profit shares lead to a form of liquidity trap, wherein firms prefer to
keep funds idle instead of investing them into capacity expansion. In such a situation, the ability
of monetary policy to stimulate the real sector through the credit channel is totally hampered.
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The results of our experiment strongly support the old-fashion Keynesian view of economic
policies with their relative emphasis on fiscal ones both as countercyclical instruments and as
necessary conditions to keep the economy on a “virtuous” high growth path. Needless to say, if
there is some truth in our conclusions they run exactly counter the current European recipes:
the recent fiscal austerity programs pursued by EMU countries are likely to worsen the state
of the economy, further lowering the rate of growth, and increasing the instability of European
economies.
The present work could be extended in at least three directions. First, in this model we
deliberately focused on a regime wherein average inflation is zero and where the Central Bank
interest rate is fixed throughout the experiments. This takes away the effects of further dis-
tributive changes induced by different inflation rates. In addition, it allows one to study more
neatly the dynamic consequences on output and unemployment of persistent interest rate poli-
cies. However, one could easily extend the analysis to a framework in which average inflation
can be positive and where the Central Bank adjusts interest rates and credit conditions in the
light of some output and inflation targeting (the famous Taylor Rule being one of the possible
strategies).
Second, one could extend the present framework to one wherein heterogeneous banks are
present. This would allow one to study the macroeconomic effects of banking crises and the
consequences on output and public finances of different bail-out schemes.
Finally, here we considered a regime where workers fully consume their wage. However, one
could move to a framework which allows for the possibility of household savings and indebted-
ness. The latter played an important role in the recent crisis. Indeed, we conjecture, they are
likely to strengthen the credit dynamics discussed in the previous sections.
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A Analytical Description of the Model
In this appendix we present the full formal structure of the real side of the model discussed in Section 3. We
start with the equations characterizing search processes and the determination of production and prices in the
capital-good sector. Next we turn to present the equations related to the determination of production, investment,
prices and profits in the consumption-good sector.
A.1 The Capital-Good Industry
In the capital-good sector there are F1 firms denoted by the subscript i. The technology of a capital-good firms is
defined by the vector (Aτi , B
τ
i ), where the former coefficient is the productivity of the manufactured machine-tool
in the consumption-good industry, the latter coefficient is the efficiency of the production technique employed by
the firm, and the positive integer τ denotes the current technology vintage. Given the monetary wage w(t), the
unit cost of production of capital-good firms is:
ci(t) =
w(t)
Bτi
. (10)
With a fixed mark-up (µ1 > 0) pricing rule, prices (pi(t)) are defined as:
pi(t) = (1 + µ1)ci(t). (11)
The unit labor cost of production entailed by a machine in the consumption-good sector is:
c(Aτi , t) =
w(t)
Aτi
.
Capital-good firms invest in R&D a fraction of their past sales (Si):
RDi(t) = νSi(t− 1), (12)
with 0 < ν < 1. R&D expenditures are used to hire researchers paying the market wage w(t). Firms split their
R&D efforts between innovation (IN) and imitation (IM) according to the parameter ξ ∈ [0, 1]:
INi(t) = ξRDi(t)
IMi(t) = (1− ξ)RDi(t).
We model innovation as a two steps process. The first step determines whether a firm successfully innovates
or not through a draw from a Bernoulli distribution, whose parameter θini (t) is given by:
θini (t) = 1− e−ζ1INi(t), (13)
with 0 < ζ1 6 1. If a firm innovates, it gets the new technology (Aini , Bini ) according to:
Aini (t) = Ai(t)(1 + x
A
i (t))
Bini (t) = Bi(t)(1 + x
B
i (t)),
where xAi and x
B
i are two independent draws from a Beta(α1, β1) over the support [x1, x1] with x1 belonging to
the interval [−1, 0] and x1 to [0, 1]19. Imitation follows a two steps procedure as well. The set of successfully
imitating firms is formed sampling from a Bernoulli(θimi (t)):
θimi (t) = 1− e−ζ2IMi(t), (14)
with 0 < ζ2 6 1. Firms accessing the second stage are able to copy the technology of one competitor (Aimi , Bimi ).
We assume that firms are more likely to imitate competitors with similar technologies. For that, we use an Eu-
clidean metrics to compute the technological distance between every pair of firms to weight imitation probabilities.
19We choose the Beta distribution because of its flexibility, able in particular to capture, according to the
parameterization, poorer or richer opportunities to make long “jumps” in the productivity space.
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Firms that successfully innovate or imitate must decide which type of machine is put on production. Knowing
that consumption-good firms invest following a payback period routine (see below), capital-good firms select the
machine to produce according to the rule:
min
[
phi (t) + bc
h(Ahi , t)
]
, h = τ, in, im, (15)
where b is a positive payback period parameter (cf. Eq. 19 below). Capital-good firms send then a “brochure”
with the price and the productivity of their machines to both their historical (HCi) and a random sample of
potential new customers (NCi). The size of the latter is proportional to HCi (i.e., NCi(t) = γHCi(t), with
γ ∈ (0, 1)).
A.2 The Consumption-Good Industry
The consumption-good sector is composed of F2 firms labelled by the subscript j. Consumption-good firms plan
their production (Qj) following the simplest adaptive demand expectations (D
e
j ):
Dej (t) = Dj(t− 1), (16)
where Dj(t − 1) is the past demand actually faced by firm j. The desired level of production (Qdj ) is computed
adding the desired inventories (Ndj ) and the actual stock of inventories (Nj) to the expected demand:
Qdj (t) = D
e
j (t) +N
d
j (t)−Nj(t− 1), (17)
with Ndj (t) = ιD
e
j (t), ι ∈ [0, 1]. Given the desired level of production and the desired rate of capacity utilization
(cud), firms compute their desired capital stock (Kdj ):
Kdj (t) =
Qdj (t)
cud
.
If the desired capital stock is higher than the current capital stock, firms invest (EIdj ) in order to increase their
capital stock 20 (Kj):
EIdj (t) = K
d
j (t)−Kj(t). (18)
We define as Ξj(t) as the set of all vintages of machine-tools belonging to firm j at time t. Moreover, if we measure
machines in terms of their production capacity (normalized to one), the capital stock is defined as:
Kj(t) =
∑
Aτi ∈Ξj(t)
gj(A
τ
i , t),
where gj(A
τ
i , t) is the absolute frequency of machine A
τ
i .
Firms scrap machines according to a payback period routine. More specifically, firm j replaces machine
Aτi ∈ Ξj(t) according to its technology obsolescence as well as to the price of new machines:
RSj(t) =
{
Aτi ∈ Ξj(t) : p
∗(t)
c(Ai,τ , t)− c∗(t) ≤ b
}
, (19)
where p∗ and c∗ are the price and unit cost of production of new machines. Firms compute their replacement
investment summing up the machine-tools satisfying Equation 19. Moreover, they also scrap the machines older
than η periods (η positive integer). Summing up expansion and replacement investment one gets the gross
investment of each firm (Ij).
Given the “brochures” received by (a subset of) capital-good firms, consumption-good firms send their in-
vestment order to the supplier with the lowest price and unit cost of production (i.e., pi(t) + bc(A
τ
i , t)). The
ordered machines are going to be delivered at the end of the period. Consumption-good firms compute average
20We assume that in any given period firm capital growth rates cannot exceed a fixed maximum threshold
consistent with the maximum capital growth rates found in the empirical literature on firm investment patterns
(e.g. Doms and Dunne, 1998).
34
productivity (pij) and unit cost of production (cj):
pij(t) =
∑
Aτi ∈Ξj(t)
Aτi
gj(A
τ
i , t)
Kj(t)
;
cj(t) =
w(t)
pij(t)
. (20)
Prices are set applying a variable markup (µj , see eq. 1) on unit costs of production:
pj(t) = (1 + µj(t))cj(t). (21)
The competitiveness (Ej) of consumption-good firms depends both on price and on the past level of unfilled
demand (lj):
Ej(t) = −ω1pj(t)− ω2lj(t), (22)
where ω1,2 are positive parameters. Weighting the competitiveness of each consumption-good firms by its past
market share (fj), one can compute the average competitiveness of the consumption-good sector:
E(t) =
F2∑
j=1
Ej(t)fj(t− 1).
Firms’ market shares evolve according to a replicator dynamics:
fj(t) = fj(t− 1)
(
1 + χ
Ej(t)− E(t)
E(t)
)
, (23)
with χ > 0. Aggregate consumption C is allocated to consumption-good firms proportionally to their market
shares:
Dj(t) = fj(t)C(t). (24)
The profits (Πj) of each consumption-good firm read as:
Πj(t) = Sj(t)− cj(t)Qj(t)− rDebj(t),
with Sj(t) = pj(t)Dj(t) and Deb denotes the stock of debt. The investment choices of consumption-good firms
and their profits determine the evolution of their stock of liquid assets (NWj):
NWj(t) = NWj(t− 1) + Πj(t)− cIj ,
where cIj is the amount of internal funds employed by firm j.
The monetary/credit side of the model is described in the text.
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B Simulations and “Benchmark” System Parameters
Description Symbol Value
Number of firms in capital-good industry F1 50
Number of firms in consumption-good industry F2 200
R&D investment propensity ν 0.04
R&D allocation to innovative search ξ 0.50
Firm search capabilities parameters ζ1,2 0.30
Beta distribution parameters (innovation process) (α1, β1) (3,3)
Beta distribution support (innovation process) [x1, x1] [−0.15, 0.15]
New-customer sample parameter γ 0.50
Desired inventories ι 0.10
Payback period b 3
“Physical” scrapping age η 20
Capital-good firm mark-up rate µ1 0.04
Consumption-good firm initial mark-up µ¯(0) 0.20
Coefficient in the consumption-good firm mark-up rule υ 0.01
Competitiveness weights ω1,2 1
Replicator dynamics coefficient χ 1
Wage setting ∆AB weight ψ1 1
Wage setting ∆cpi weight ψ2 0
Wage setting ∆U weight ψ3 0
Tax rate tr 0.10
Unemployment subsidy rate ϕ 0.40
Loan-to-value ratio λ 2
Credit Multiplier k 2
Baseline Interest Rate r 0.025
Bank mark-up coefficient ψL 0.50
Bank mark-down coefficient ψD 1
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